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Abstract: Whilst the relationship between money and success in elite sport is acknowledged, the exact 
nature, extent and implications of this relationship is one that has not been carefully examined. In this 
paper we have three main aims. Firstly, to provide empirical evidence of the extent that money buys 
success in the English Premier League. Secondly, to evaluate this evidence from a sports ethics 
perspective, and, finally, to discuss potential solutions to the problem. We argue that the evident 
performance advantage teams gain through financial investments is contrary to the spirit of sport as it 
undermines athletic excellence and the ‘sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome’ that is central to good 
competition. Consequently, financial investments in elite football ought to be regulated and controlled. 
We argue, however, that current attempts to do so (via Financial Fair Play Regulations) are inadequate 




The 2015/16 English Premier League was hailed by many as the best and most spectacular since 
the competition’s inception in 1992/93. What made this season so spectacular was the fact it 
was won by Leicester City a team who were 5000-1 outsiders to win the league at the start of the 
season. Bookmakers were offering the same odds on Elvis Presley being found alive in the same 
year (The Independent, 2016). Former Leicester City player turned BBC sport presenter, Gary 
Linker, described Leicester’s success as ‘actually impossible’ and that nothing ‘surpasses it in 
sporting history’ (BBC News, 2016). Whether or not this represents the most unlikely feat in the 
history of sport, commentators and fans alike are celebrating the fact that a traditionally weak 
and poor club managed to win a league dominated by four or five rich and powerful ‘super 
clubs’.  
Whilst it would be in bad taste to pour cold water on Leicester’s triumph, such ‘miracles’ serve 
to mask a deep rooted problem in professional football in the UK and beyond. Until Leicester’s 
victory, the English Premier League has been dominated by clubs that have the financial 
capacity to put together squads comprised of the best, and therefore most expensive players (in 
terms of transfer fee and wage bills). The advantage such clubs gain from their financial power 
has long been considered contrary to the ideal of a level playing field in sport. The ability to 
draw on almost limitless financial resources to finance teams brimming with superstars has 
recently been referred to as ‘financial doping’ (Muller et al, 2012). Such clubs essentially ‘buy’ 
success (Walsh and Giulianotti, 2007; Szymanski, 2014). Clubs that have less capital cannot 
compete and Kevin Keegan (previous manager of Newcastle United) and Arsene Wenger 
(manager of Arsenal United) claim that a few select clubs have monopolised the league (Curran 
et al, 2009). The reality is that Leicester’s triumph is an anomaly in a fairly consistent correlation 
between success and wealth.   
Leicester’s story raises a number of interesting and significant questions about fairness and the 
antecedents of success in commercialised elite sport. For example, despite the fact that the link 
between expenditure of a sport club and their sporting success is acknowledged, the exact 
nature and extent of this relationship has not been carefully examined. Deeper philosophical 
questions about sport’s ideals are also brought into sharp relief when we examine the empirical 
evidence more closely. If success in the English Premier League is ‘determined’ by or at least 
perfectly correlated with financial clout, then the “sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome” at 
the heart of sport is undermined1. Although its custom and practice in elite football to allow a 
free market (unlike US sports where a draft system is used which distributes players more 
equitably throughout competing clubs), we believe it is time to question seriously the status quo 
in light of the evidence we present below.   
 
We have three aims in this paper: 
 To provide empirical evidence of the extent that money buys success in the English 
Premier League. 
 To evaluate this evidence from a sports ethics perspective. 
 To discuss potential solutions to the problem.  
 
Reviewing the Existing Empirical Evidence 
In one of the most comprehensive empirical investigations on competitive balance and fairness 
in sport, Hall and Szymanski (2002) provide a detailed correlational analysis of the link between 
expenditure and success in Major League Baseball (MLB) and the English Premier League (EPL) 
1980 - 20002. They compared winning percentages in the regular season to payroll spending by 
each team. Payroll spending for each team was calculated as a percentage, relative to the 
average payroll spending of all teams for that season. First they looked for correlational 
relationships and subsequently attempted to prove causality. Hall and Szymanski (2002) 
established that the correlation between team performance and payroll was relatively weak in 
MLB from 1980 to the mid 1990s, but increased thereafter. In contrast, the correlation for the 
EPL was strong throughout. For example, in the MLB a team spending 50% less than the league 
average on payroll could expect a 0.453 winning percentage, whilst a team in the EPL with 
similar expenditure could expect a record of 0.423. A team spending 50% more than average in 
the MLB on the other hand could expect a winning percentage of 0.550 and in the EPL a similar 
expenditure would bring a 0.614 winning percentage. The results showed that in both 
competitions expenditure was decisive, but more so in EPL than MLB (Hall and Szymanski, 
2002). Hall and Szymanski (2002) suggest that the differences in the relationship between 
payroll and performance in MLB and the EPL are probably a result of the different institutional 
rules that govern the respective competitions. The MLB constrain spending on players, player 
mobility, squad sizes, and the right to trade players, limiting the opportunity for financial 
superiority to be translated into athletic superiority. Whilst they provide crucial empirical 
evidence of the link between club expenditure and success, a key limitation of the work is the 
time period investigated. Their data set ends precisely at the time of major changes in the EPL 
in terms of spending habits.  
Curran et al (2009) provide a longer term and updated analysis of competitive balance in top-
flight English Football between the seasons of 1948/9 to 2007/8. Unfortunately, Curran et al 
(2009) focus solely on competitive balance and domination, and do not include spending as part 
of their analysis. Nonetheless, we argue (and our own empirical findings will confirm) that their 
findings provide a clear picture of the consequences of financial supremacy. Curran et al (2009) 
use various statistical measures to evaluate competitive balance in top-flight premier league 
over six decades. Their primary statistical measure was to develop a concentration index that 
tests the degree to which the four most successful teams in a particular decade dominate the 
league. Concentration ratios or indexes are often used to determine the concentration or 
domination in a particular industry. So this index provides a statistical number that suggests 
how competitive an industry, or in this instance a sport league is, over a particular time period. 
Between 1948/9-1957/8 the most successful 4 teams (Manchester United, Wolverhampton 
Wonderers, Portsmouth, Tottenham Hotspur) occupied the top 4 positions 21 times out of the 
40 possible in that decade; a concentration percentage of 52.5%. Contrast this with 1998/9-
2007/8 where the 4 dominant teams (Manchester United, Arsenal, Liverpool and Chelsea) had 
secured 34 of the 40 positions available, which translate into an 85% concentration ratio. A top 
four placing is used as a measure of success due to the fact that they qualify for the premier 
European club competition (currently named the Champions League) that provides these clubs 
which huge amounts of income. A top four placing is therefore considered a successful result 
for clubs in the EPL. Curran et al’s (2009) findings demonstrate that a select few clubs 
increasingly occupy the top 4 placings. Their findings are displayed in the table below: 
 
Fig 1. Curran et al’s (2009) Findings 
Years Top 4 index % Number of teams 
in top 4 
1948/9-1957/8 52.5 14 
1958/9-1967/8 55 16 
1988/9-1977/8 57.5 14 
1978/9-1987/8 62.5 12 
1988/9-1997/8 60 13 
1998/9-2007/8 85 7 
 
As is evident in the table above, competitive balance has decreased significantly over the past 
sixty years, to the extent that between the years 1998/9-2007/8 only 7 different teams finished 
in the top 4 over that decade. Curran et al (2009: 1742) conclude that the ‘Premiership appears to 
consist, at present, of five (Manchester United, Liverpool, Chelsea, Arsenal, plus one other) 
competing teams and 15 non-competing teams.’ They argue that the non-competing teams have 
no real chance of competing for the title, or of finishing in the top 4 but rather are merely trying 
to qualify for the second tier European competition, or simply to avoid relegation. 
The findings of Hall and Szymanski (2002) and Curran et al (2009) provide a clear illustration of 
recent trends in top flight English football. Whilst Hall and Szymanski (2002) include spending 
as a variable, their data set is limited by the fact that they do not account for the major changes 
in the spending habits of dominant clubs over the past decade or so. We thus suspect that their 
empirical evidence underplays the extent to which money dictates success in elite level football. 
Curran et al’s (2009) research provides a more comprehensive illustration of how competitive 
balance has significantly decreased in top-flight English football, but crucially they do not 
attempt to explain the cause of this decrease. Our data collection method aims to address both 
these limitations, and thus provides an updated account of the relationship between financial 
spending, success and domination in the English Premier League. 
 
Research Design 
Method and Measures: The two variables of interest for this study were the spending habits of 
Premier League football clubs and their success in the league competition. Success was 
measured variously, either in terms of who won the league, who finished in the top 4, or by 
final league position. The spending habits of Premier League football clubs could be measured 
in several ways. Our preference was to use a Transfer Price Index (TPI) that calculates spending 
in terms of how much has been spent on players in the transfer market. This was done both in 
terms of the cost of the overall squad over a season (Sq£), and in terms of the average cost of the 
starting XI of each team over a season (£XIs). The latter was calculated by working out the 
average cost of each 38 (or 42) starting XI a club fields in a season3. Media observers often 
discuss the relationship between success and spending in the context of net spending. But net 
spending often covers an arbitrary cut-off point, for example the most recent summer, or the 
years since a certain manager took charge. It does not account for the value in the squad before 
that cut-off point. For instance, a high net spend one summer may ignore that the club had not 
spent much for five years before that. A low net spend may ignore that half a billion pounds 
had already been invested in players during the previous transfer windows. These are all 
fluctuations successfully covered by the £XI.  
Procedure: In order to calculate the TPI (squad and starting XI) all transfer fees from 1992 to 2016 
were collected using various sources; the Rothmans Football Yearbook (now the Sky Sports 
Football Yearbook); broadsheet newspapers; various websites and other media sources. 
Transfer fees are not always reported accurately or consistently, but a variety of sources were 
consulted in order to find as accurate a figure as possible. Transfer deals and fees have become 
increasingly complex and obscure, with various performance clauses and add-ons. For example, 
it is often the case that an initial fee will be paid by a club, which is subsequently to be 
supplemented by further fees when a player fulfils various targets, such as appearances, 
international honours, or a certain amount of goals. In order to be consistent here, the highest 
payable figure was always used, that is the highest price that a club may have to pay, and 
usually the amount they eventually do pay, for a particular transfer.  
A crucial aspect to the validity and reliability of TPI as a measure is that it takes inflation into 
account. Inflation was determined by calculating the mean average of all transfers (excluding 
free transfers) during a particular season. This average is then compared to the initial starting 
point (season 1992/93) and inflation/deflation is tracked on an annual basis.  Most years the 
average rises, often in keeping with increasing television right deals and competition money. 
Currently the transfer average stands at just over 13 times what it was in 1992/3, 6.5 times the 
standard rate of UK inflation (which has seen Retail Price Index figures not even double in the 
same 24-year period). Below is a figure that represents Premier League transfer inflation in 
comparison to UK inflation. 
Fig 2: Premier League inflation vs UK inflation 
 Results 
The results are split into three levels of analysis; firstly, in terms of winning the league, secondly 
in terms of finishing in the top 4, and lastly in terms of respective league position at the end of 
the season.  
 
1. TPI and Winning the Premier League 
Fig 3. Relationship between the average cost of a team’s starting XI over a season with inflation 
applied (dot indicates title winners). 
 For the first twelve Premier League seasons, the difference in XI costs between the most 
successful clubs were fairly minimal, and apart from the fact that only three different teams 
won the EPL during this period, there is no clear correlation between spending and winning the 
league within the sample included. Since the season 2004-2005, however, there is a clear 
difference, and only the three costliest £XIs have competed for the league. The shaded area 
shows that since Arsenal won the title in 2004 and Leicester in 2016, no one outside this zone 
has won the title. Indeed, during these 11 seasons, the 4th and 5th clubs in terms of £XIs are a 
long way off being in this zone. Until Leicester in 2015-16, no team with an average £XIs of less 
than £210m won the Premier League in over a decade.  
Fig 4. Relationship between the average cost of a team’s squad with inflation applied (the dot 
indicates the title winners). 
 
 
Again, similar to the average cost of XI, the cost of the squad is clearly correlated with sporting 
success, especially over the last decade or so. Until Leicester in 2015-16, no team with a squad 
that cost less than £397 million won the title in the decade previously. What is clearly evident 
here is that over this ten year period there were effectively three teams (Chelsea, Manchester 
United and Manchester City) who were challenging for the title. The 4th and 5th teams in terms 
of spending (Liverpool and Arsenal) spend significantly less, which we suggest is a key reason 
why they are also uncompetitive. The next section will provide more detailed analysis of the 
concentration of teams at the top of the league between 1992-2016, and also the relationship 
between the winners, top 4, and the rest of the league in terms of spending.  
2. TPI and the top 4 
Fig 5. Average £XI of league, top 4 and the winners between 1992-2016 
 
This graph shows the differences in the spending habits of the league as a whole (blue) 
compared to the teams which finish in the top 4 (green) and those who win (yellow). The data 
clearly shows that spending and success are positively correlated and that this relationship is 
getting stronger. What is particularly worrying is that the average spending habits of the league 
has not increased significantly over the 24-year period, whereas the average £XIs of the top 4, 
and the £XIs of title winners have increased significantly over time. The gap between the 
wealthy successful clubs, and the unsuccessful and poor ones, is thus increasing. This graph 
also clearly highlights the extraordinary season of 2015-16 where Leicester contradicted a trend 
that had lasted for nearly quarter of a century. 
 
3. TPI and League Position 
This last data set aims to give a broader account of the relationship between money and success 
for all teams in the premier league.  




The above chart demonstrates the final league standings for all seasons between 1992 and 2016. 
The chart is also colour graded in terms of £XI rank, so that the costliest £XI (rank 1) is shaded 
in the deepest red, and the cheapest £XI (rank 20) in white, and all other ranks in gradual 
shades between. The actual rank and £XI of each team is also provided on each block. Again, 
this chart clearly shows the relation between spending and relative success of teams in the 
Premier League. The teams at the top tend to be those deeper shades of red, and those at the 
bottom tend to be lighter in shade. This correlational trend is also becoming stronger as the 
seasons progress.  
The final graph below attempts to illustrate how this trend is getting stronger by calculating the 
differences between £XI rank for each season, with their actual finishing position. In other 
words, the strength of the relationship between spending and success is calculated by the 
difference in spending rank and their actual league finishing position. A greater difference 
between these rankings indicates a smaller correlation between spending and success. As a 
corollary, smaller differences between these rankings suggests a higher correlation between 
spending and success.  
 
Fig 7. Difference between actual league position and £XI of whole premier league vs top 7 with 
trend lines 
  
Over the past 24 years the £XI of a team can, on average, predict to within 3.7 positions where 
that team will end up at the end of the season. Predictions of which teams will finish towards 
the top of the table is much more accurate, with an average of 2.7 for the same time period. This 
suggests that there is greater mobility and movement in finishing positions at mid and low table 
positions. For example, teams who were ranked 17th in terms of £XI may well finish in 10th place 
at the end of the season, but it’s rare for lower ranked teams to get into the top 7. The above 
graph clearly shows that the league as a whole has become less competitive and more 
predictable (red line), and moreover that the gap between the top seven (blue line) and the 
league as a whole (red line) has widened. Looking at the top 7 teams in a particular season 
clearly demonstrates that the Premier league is becoming less competitive and more 
predictable. For example, in 2015-16, on average the top seven teams will finish within 1.3 
places of where they were predicted based on their £XI rank. 
 
An Ethical Evaluation of the Empirical Evidence 
The term ‘doping’ most commonly refers to the use of substances (drugs such as EPO) and 
methods (such as blood doping) of improving sporting performances which are currently 
prohibited by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). More recently, however, the term has 
become a label for a broad range of purportedly dubious or unethical means of gaining 
advantage in sport (Schubert and Konecke, 2015). For example, the term ‘mechanical doping’ 
has been used in the context of elite road cycling to refer to the alleged use of illegal technology 
such as hidden motors in bicycle cranks, frames and wheels. Similarly, Oscar Pistorius was 
accused of ‘techno-doping’ because his blades were thought to give him an unfair advantage 
over competitors that did not use them (Schubert and Konecke, 2015). The term ‘financial 
doping’ is perhaps the latest addition to this normative vocabulary. It is thought that Arsenal 
FC manager Arsene Wenger was the first to use the term ‘financial doping’ to describe the 
advantage that Roman Abramovich’s billions of pounds gave Chelsea FC. His financial backing 
allowed Chelsea FC to purchase the best players and therefore ‘buy’ success.  
Whilst Arsene Wenger may have been the first to use the term ‘financial doping’ in a football 
context, it was Muller et al (2012) who first attempted an academic definition of the concept.  
They defined ‘financial doping’ as: 
…financial means not earned by a club directly or indirectly through its sporting 
operations or supporter reputation, but rather provided by an external investor, 
benefactor or creditor detached from sporting merit and supporter reputation as 
well as from sustainable investment motivations (pp,123-4). 
Whilst Muller et al’s (2012) definition captures the increasing practice of billionaire investors 
buying football clubs as something of a ‘pet project’, it seems overly narrow and exclusive. 
Investors might buy a club because of previous sporting merit and history, or perhaps they 
were supporters of the club in the first place. Similarly, a club may have accrued wealth not as a 
result of external investors, but due to previous successes that have led to a large fan base and 
commercial turnover. Whilst financial inequalities based on such factors might not seem as 
outwardly problematic, the result is the same, namely that some teams have the financial 
capacity to dominate others. It therefore not clear that supporter and sporting operations can be 
so easily disentangled from external benefactor investments in the way Muller et al’s (2012) 
definition suggests.  
In using the term ‘financial doping’ one presumably seeks to place the enhancement of 
performance through financial investments on the same footing as illegitimate enhancement of 
performance through banned substances and practices. In other words, if EPO is banned 
because of reasons a,b,c, then those reasons apply equally to financial domination in sport. 
According to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) code, a substance and/or method is 
prohibited if at least two of the following apply; it enhances sport performance, it poses a 
potential health risk to the athlete, it violates the spirit of sport. One can debate whether certain 
substances or methods do in fact qualify as a form of doping according to the above criteria, but 
we take it that if something does in fact enhance performance, poses a health risk, and violates 
the spirit of sport, then it ought to be considered illegitimate and should be banned or 
regulated. Our aim in this section is to argue in light of this framework that certain economic 
practices in the EPL constitute a form of doping because they provide an illegitimate 
performance advantage that undermines the spirit of sport.  
The empirical evidence that demonstrates the performance advantage gained by spending in 
the EPL is unequivocal.4 The key issue, however, is why this is considered an illegitimate means 
of performance enhancement and contrary to the spirit of sport? The ‘spirit of sport’ criterion 
covers a range of significant ethical claims, such as those centered on fairness, justice, integrity 
and the naturalness of sporting performance. Whilst this criterion has been subject to 
considerable critique due to its conceptually vague, open, and ‘catch-all’ nature, we agree with 
McNamee (2014) that it is essential for the demarcation of doping. McNamee (2014: 166-7) 
claims that ‘if we want to argue that there are some ways of preparing for and competing in 
sports that threaten the (contested) ideals that it stands for, we must have some mechanism by 
which that is done and a spirit of sport criterion is crucial towards this end. What is needed 
then is a clear and detailed account of the values, goods and virtues that sport ideally 
instantiate’, and then an account of how these are undermined by certain methods and practices 
(McNamee, 2014: 167). Our task here, then, is to show how certain financial practices in the EPL 
undermine the values and principles that make such competition worthwhile and meaningful. 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive account of the goods and 
virtues that sport ought to instantiate, we argue that two significant ideals are undermined by 
financial practices in the EPL: 
 
1. The ideal of justice and athletic excellence, where success is primarily determined by 
those factors which are internal and relevant to the purpose of the game (athletic 
excellence, skill, teamwork, work ethic, coaching, playing philosophy and so on) rather 
than those which are external and irrelevant (money and wealth). 
2. The ideal of fair and meaningful competition, where competitive balance sustains a 
‘sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome’. 
 
We do not claim this list to be exhaustive nor do we claim that these goods are constitutive 
or definitive of sport. Rather, these ideals are at the heart of what matters about sport, and 
sporting activity that includes such values are preferable to those that lack them (Walsh and 
Guilianotti, 2007). We therefore ought to promote and cultivate these goods and be critical of 
any activities or factors that may suffocate them.  
 
Justice, Merit and Athletic Excellence 
In the context of sport, justice is generally concerned with the proper and just allocation of 
honours and prizes, in terms of who ought to win a game, a league, or a trophy. In other 
words, justice requires the right individual or team win for the right reason. Whilst, Rawls’ 
(1971) notion of ‘justice as fairness’ suggest the need for a degree of fairness and equality in 
the distribution of goods and benefits, most political philosophers (including Rawls) argue 
that different goods have different natures and meanings, and thus need to be distributed 
accordingly (Walzer, 1983; Anderson, 1993; MacIntyre, 2007). For example, it could be 
argued that education and health are universal rights for each individual, and these goods 
should be distributed on egalitarian or need-based terms. Other goods, such as love, have a 
different nature and meaning, and thus might require distribution according to different 
distributive principle, for example free-exchange. It is quite clear that sporting honours and 
prizes ought not to be distributed equally. Prizes and honours, which are central to 
competitive sport, are merit goods. These goods ought to be distributed and allocated 
according to those who most deserve them.  
In terms of who deserves victories and honours in sport, the notion of athletic excellence or 
performance is central. The goal of sport is to ‘measure, compare, and rank two or more 
competitors according to athletic performance’ (Loland, 2002: 10). Athletic performance or 
ability includes natural or developed physical ability, effort, work ethic, tactical ability, 
psychological ability, and skill, all of which are central towards meeting the challenge set 
out by the rules of a game (Jones and Howe, 2005). Identifying inequalities in athletic 
performance and ability is central to the nature and purpose of sport, and thus is identifying 
who deserves victories, honours and prizes. For sporting challenges to be just, the influence 
of irrelevant inequalities must be eliminated or controlled in order to accurately measure 
differences in the relevant inequalities of athletic performance (Loland, 2002).  
The pursuit of justice in sport can be undermined in several ways. Most of the philosophy of 
sport literature has focused on those issues that directly and explicitly undermine justice and 
fairness. Some of these issues, such as taking banned performance enhancing drugs and 
match fixing, seem categorically problematic. These directly undermine the basic conditions 
of equality that are necessary to establish athletic superiority, which is central to the 
intelligibility of sporting competition5. Other factors that may undermine justice in sport are 
more disputable, for example, simulation, sledging, environment, gamesmanship, and luck. 
These factors may undermine the pursuit of justice in sport, but there exists debate 
regarding the extent to which they do so, and whether they should be regulated or 
controlled.  
Whilst most philosophers of sport have focused on injustices within a game, or in specific 
game related contexts, there have been some discussions on those broader issues that might 
similarly undermine the pursuit of athletic excellence. These factors include the ways in 
which competitive sport is structured, organized, and regulated. Morgan (2006), for 
example, has argued that the increasing trend of professional sport leagues adopting a 
playoff format to determine the overall winner is evidence of the way in which modern 
commercialized sport often puts profit ahead of and at the expense of excellence. Such 
playoff structures, according to Morgan (2006), allow less deserving teams to win the league. 
Here then, there are fundamental questions regarding what types of excellences are 
important and who deserves to win. Is it the most consistent team, is it the team who can 
perform under pressure, is it the team who wins the most games, or the team who loses the 
least?6  
What unites all of the above, however, is that justice and athletic excellence is (or at least 
could be) undermined directly. That is, if we ask the question of whether the right person or 
team won for the right reasons, the answer may well be ‘no’. For example, the right person 
did not win because they were cheated by those who took performance enhancing drugs, or 
the right team did not win because the playoff format meant the team who consistently 
demonstrated athletic excellence lost due to bad luck. Financial investments in the EPL, 
however, do not directly undermine athletic excellence in the same way. When Chelsea FC 
spent heavily and won the league in 2004-5 and 2005-6, one cannot claim that the right team 
did not win for the right reason. Chelsea were the best team, and demonstrated superior 
footballing excellence throughout both seasons. It was the skill, ability and athletic 
excellence of the players that lead to success. The ‘game’ itself is unharmed for athletic 
excellence is not absent nor diminished as such. In fact, it could be argued that footballing 
excellence is actually enhanced by having the best players playing together. What makes 
financial investments problematic is that the value of success is blemished because it has 
been reduced to a commodity. Whilst it is the athletic ability of the players that actually win 
games the distribution of such athletic talent in the first place is primarily determined by the 
wealth and spending capacity of clubs. This ‘commodification of success’ is ulterior to the 
game itself and for this reason is inconspicuous.  
Loland (2002: 61) has similarly argued that success at the highest levels of sport is 
increasingly determined by such ‘system inequalities’. According to Loland (2002: 61) 
athletic performances are  ‘developed within large ‘systems’ of material, technological and 
scientific resources’ which mean the ‘public admiration of the winning athlete or team 
appears to be based on false premises’ for elite sport does not just compare and rank 
‘competitors according to skills; rather we are measuring the strength of whole systems.’ 
Whilst all manifestations of such ‘system inequalities’ are potentially problematic, they are 
more so in team games compared with individual sports. Access to better resources and 
support through financial capacity is certainly important in terms of maximizing individual 
performance and success, but it does not usually outweigh the significance of factors such as 
ability, work ethic, skill and so on. In team sports, however, a club owner can ‘buy’ rather 
than develop success.  Team sports are more susceptible to the pathological consequences of 
commercialisation for it is the team who wins trophies and gets the rewards and not 
individuals. In the Tour de France, a team can buy the best cyclists and thus the yellow 
jersey, but crucially, it is the individual cyclist who really wins and is admired, not the team. 
Whether Chris Froome wins in Team Sky colours or in another team’s colours does not 
really matter, for it is Froome who wins the yellow jersey regardless. In team sports such as 
football, where the competition is really between teams, the situation is qualitatively 
different because money can dictate ‘who’ actually wins. Put simply, an individual cannot 
buy talent for himself or herself, but a team can. 
We are not arguing that ability, work ethic, tactics, and skill are irrelevant in team sports, 
rather that these crucial variables of success are inextricably connected to financial 
considerations. Prior to Manchester City FC’s purchase by Abu Dhabi United Group 
Investment and Development Limited, they were a mid to low table team who had never 
finished in the top 7 since the EPL started in 1992. In the eight years since their purchase, 
they have been among the top three rank in terms of £XI, and they have won the EPL twice, 
finished second twice, and third once. It is unequivocal that the key variable to success is 
money. A club without the requisite wealth and spending capacity cannot overturn this 
deficiency by working harder, by developing better tactics, or by practicing more and so on. 
This ultimately means that relevant and internal goods of sport have been reduced to the 
irrelevant and external goods of the market. As Morgan (2006: 141-142) persuasively argues: 
 …when money speaks louder than excellence, a not-so-subtle shift occurs in our 
conception and regard for sport … For when the complex (because compound) 
ends of sport are reduced to simple, discrete ones, which is what follows when 
those ends are stripped of any and all specifications as to how they are to be 
attained, sports become essentially instruments for attaining certain states of affairs 
(e.g. crossing the goal line in football or the finish line in a footrace) as efficiently as 
possible. So, getting the ball across the goal line in football now can accommodate 
without theoretical or practical contradiction not just things as rushing of passing 
but holding as well, and crossing the finish line in a foot race can likewise 
accommodate, again without conceptual or practical duress, not just outpacing but 
tripping one’s opponents. Of course, the point here is that…incorporating these 
scaled-down ends and hyped-up means as part of the legitimate repertoire of skills, 
moves, tactics, and ends of sports makes a mockery of them, of their basic point and 
purpose. Here again, then, the key to resuscitating the rationality of sports is to 
stave off their instrumentalization, to make the pursuit of victory congruent with 
the distinctive ways in which they require their participants go at things rather than 
the dominant, technical way in which the market requires us to go at things.  
This commodification of success is problematic for the notion of buying merit goods such as 
honours seems inimical to their very nature and intelligibility. In the same way that love 
would be rendered meaningless if it was bought, sporting success loses its value if it is 
reduced to a commodity. Put simply, sport should be about who is the strongest, fastest, 
most technically or tactically skilled, who has worked the hardest, and not about who is the 
wealthiest or who has the access to the best resources. 
 
Distributive Injustice and the ‘Sweet Tension of Uncertainty of Outcome’ 
The fact that competition has shifted away from the pitch and onto the quest for the 
wealthiest owner or creditor is problematic in its own right. A subsequent consequence to 
this commodification of success, which we argue is even more problematic, is that it sustains 
a morally pernicious form of distributive injustice that significantly undermines the aesthetic 
and competitive appeal of elite sport. The problem with allowing the market to distribute 
and allocate athletic talent is that the wealthy will acquire a greater share of such talent than 
the less wealthy (Walsh and Guilianotti, 2007). More often than not, market allocation leads 
to distributive injustice and oligopoly. As the empirical evidence demonstrates, the 
consequence of this distributive injustice in the EPL is that competitive balance and 
uncertainty of outcome (over a season) is significantly and radically undermined. Such 
distributive injustice in sport thus undermines important ideals that are at the heart of the 
purpose and value of sport, namely that sporting competition ought to be challenging, 
competitive and the outcome unpredictable. 
In explaining the nature and purpose of competitive sport Kretchmar (1975) argues that the 
notion of a ‘test’ or ‘challenge’ is essential. Indeed, sporting contests would be unintelligible 
in the absence of such a challenge. Kretchmar (1975) elaborates that a ‘test’ must be 
simultaneously impregnable and vulnerable. Impregnability refers to the aspect of a ‘test’ 
that invokes a sense of uncertainty on the part of the performer due to it being challenging 
and difficult. Vulnerability refers to the facet of a test that allows the performer to believe 
they might succeed. The key point for Kretchmar (1975: 25) is that a good test is one where 
the right balance is achieved between impregnability and vulnerability; where victory is not 
achieved too easily, or when success is impossible: 
 
Tests simply become unthinkable or unintelligible in the absence of such 
opposition. As suggested, if something were merely vulnerable, the ‘test’ would 
become gratuitous facilitation and one’s project a foregone conclusion. Nothing 
would be tested. This is the case with any project which can be done simply, 
automatically, or without any trouble. On the other hand, if something were merely 
impregnable, the ‘test’ would become a ‘state of affairs’, and one’s project would be 
wholly futile. Again, nothing would be tested.  
 
Kretchmar’s (1975) definition of a test as something impregnable and vulnerable captures 
something fundamental regarding the nature and purpose of sport. From the perspective of 
performers, success and victory gains value in the context of a worthy and challenging test 
or opponent. If there is no real possibility of failing in this challenge, then something 
important seems to be amiss. For example, even in recreational 5-a-side football between 
friends, if one team is clearly dominating a game, then usually play will be stopped and the 
teams will be reorganized as to create a fairer, more challenging, and thus better 
competition. Whilst the situation is different in elite sport, the same logic applies to what 
represents good competition. Whilst one or two easy victories a season may not undermine 
the value of winning, a season full of easy victories would surely diminish the sense of 
satisfaction one hopes to gain from overcoming a difficult challenge. From a spectator 
perspective, the requirements for impregnability and vulnerability manifest themselves in 
the desirability of competitive balance and unpredictability. A sporting challenge where the 
outcome is entirely predictable beforehand severely undermines the value and 
attractiveness of such competition.  The claim that sport thrives under the ‘sweet tension of 
uncertainty of outcome’ pithily captures the competitive and aesthetic appeal of competitive 
balance and unpredictability. The 2015-16 EPL season was considered spectacular precisely 
because Leicester’s triumph was surprising, that the ‘test’ they overcame was worthy of 
admiration. The reason so many are critical of practices such as doping, cheating, match-
fixing and strong forms of gamesmanship, is that they, like financial investments, diminish 
the difficulty and value of the test which is central to sporting competition. 
From this perspective, the distributive injustice sustained by financial practices in the EPL 
seems at odds with sports’ rationality, and what characterizes ‘good competition’. As Fig 3 
demonstrates, for the decade prior to Leicester’s success, the EPL was a competition between 
three of the clubs who spent the most, namely Chelsea, Manchester United, and Manchester 
City. The influence of financial investments in the EPL clearly sustains a form of 
‘distributive injustice’, where some clubs have the capacity to dominate. The EPL as a 
meaningful sporting competition is severely undermined if most teams in the league do not 
have any real chance of wining the league. Apart from anomalies like the 2015-16 season, in 
reality the EPL is at best a competition between four or five of the wealthiest clubs. Since the 
EPL started in 1992-93, the league is becoming increasingly uncompetitive and predictable. 
Indeed, as Fig 7 demonstrates, who will finish in the top third of the EPL can be accurately 
predicted based on £XI spending. What often hides this predictability of success in the EPL 
is the fact that most games, when taken individually, seem competitive. In this sense, the 
outcome of individual games is relatively unpredictable, and all teams justifiably believe 
they have the potential to win each individual game. The problem is that the competition as 
a whole is predictable. On aggregate, teams who do not have the capacity to spend do not 
have a realistic chance of winning the league against those teams that do spend. The games 
may well be competitive, but the competition is not.  
Action: Financial Fair Play, Anti-Doping and Health  
We have argued above that financial practices in the EPL are ethically problematic in similar 
ways to performance enhancing drugs, namely that it provides performance advantages that 
are contrary to the spirit of sport. As a result we argue that the influence of money in the 
EPL need to be regulated and controlled. The suggestion that the over-commercialisation of 
sport is threatening its integrity and future vitality is by no means new (Morgan, 2006; 
Walsh and Giulianotti, 2007; Lasch, 2010; Muller et al, 2012; Franck, 2014; Szymanski, 2014) 
and is not lost on footballing authorities. Such concerns presumably led the Union of 
European Football Associations (UEFA) to introduce their Financial Fair Play (FFP) 
regulations, which some scholars (Szymanski, 2014; Schubert and Konecke: 2015) consider to 
be a form of anti-doping policy.  
The FFP regulations have often been discussed with reference to the ‘health’ metaphor. 
Whilst financial practices in the EPL have no effect on the health of athletes themselves, it 
could be considered harmful to the health of football. There are two main concerns that have 
been raised with respect to the health of elite football in particular. The first focuses on the 
aforementioned issues concerned with competitive balance and fairness, and the way some 
clubs can effectively ‘buy success’. Here, then, claims are being made with respect to the 
health of football in terms of its ideals, purposes and values (the spirit of the game). The 
second issue is to do with financial stability. As a result of sponsorship and advertising 
deals, broadcasting rights, higher attendances, price increases, and higher levels of 
merchandising among other things, the revenues of elite football clubs are constantly 
increasing (Muller et al, 2012; Frank, 2014). Despite these exploding revenues, football clubs 
(including the successful and wealthy ones) are generally unprofitable (Muller et al, 2012; 
Franck, 2014). The terms ‘hyperactivity’ and ‘rat race’ have been used to refer to a situation 
where entire leagues operate successfully whilst most of the clubs participating seem to be 
on the verge of bankruptcy (Franck, 2014). Whilst some clubs operate successfully under 
such conditions, there are significant concerns regarding the long-term sustainability of such 
hyperactivity, especially for those clubs which do not have the backing of wealthy owners 
and investors (Franck, 2014). The question of whether FFP rules could be considered a form 
of anti-doping policy largely depends on the intentions and objectives of the FFP 
regulations, and whether they are focused on ‘health’ in terms of finances, ‘health’ in terms 
of the spirit and ideals of sport, or both.  
The FFP rules demand that clubs operate within their means, or in other words that they 
cannot spend more than they earn. Whilst the regulations are heavily focused on addressing 
financial stability, the wording of the regulation suggests that they are also meant to address 
‘fair play’ and competitive balance in European club football. Moreover, when UEFA 
president Michel Platini first discussed the FFP regulations, it was full of references to 
inequality, domination and competitive balance (Szymanski, 2014). Over time, however, 
reference to issues of fairness have all but disappeared, as is evident from the following 
quotation from Platini in 2015 (UEFA, 2015): 
 
Financial fair play has led to a dramatic improvement in club finances and has 
restored business credibility in our sport. When we began this process, financial 
losses stood at €1.7bn per year, but now it is in the €400m-€500m range. In a short 
period of time, financial fair play is achieving what it set out to do: restore the 
financial health or European football and put clubs on a much better and more solid 
financial foundation. 
 
So whilst there is some evidence that the new FFP regulations have had a positive impact 
(ostensibly at least) on the issue of financial instability in European football (UEFA, 2015), 
there is less evidence or mention of their effect on competitive balance and fairness. Several 
authors question whether the regulations were really ever focused on fairness, rather that 
they were about financial efficiency and survival (Muller et al, 2012; Szymanski; 2014). 
Indeed, the objectives of FFP regulations (UEFA, 2015) states nothing about fairness: 
a) To improve the economic and financial capability of the clubs, increasing their 
transparency and credibility. 
b) To place the necessary importance on the protection of creditors and to ensure that 
clubs settle their liabilities with players, social/tax authorities and other clubs 
punctually. 
c) To introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances. 
d) To encourage more clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues. 
e) To encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football; and 
f) To protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football.  
 
On UEFA’s website they have produced a question and answer section on FFP regulations 
and have attempted to define their purpose in one sentence; ‘FFP is about improving the 
overall financial health of European Club Football’. Moreover, on another section of their 
website, titled ‘FFP is working’, they provide an overview of a recent FFP workshop 
attended by licensing and financial experts, and attempt to prove the success of the 
regulations. There is no mention of the effect of FFP regulations on fairness and 
competitive balance, only details on the impact on the bank balances of European football 
clubs (UEFA, 2015).  
It seems clear that concerns regarding financial stability dominate the thinking of UEFA. It 
is widely claimed in academic circles and within the sports practice community that the 
FFP regulations have done nothing to eradicate unfairness in European football. For 
example Szymanski (2014) claims that the FFP rules do little more that substitute one form 
of inequality for another, and if anything has widened the gap between the wealthy and 
the less well off. Since wealthy and established clubs can build revenue on the basis of 
previous successes and investments, they have much larger financial incomes, and thus 
are allowed to spend more. From this perspective, the FFP rules merely serve to keep the 
status quo in European Football. 
One can only speculate on the motives and intentions of UEFA in introducing their FFP 
regulations, but it is difficult to disagree with Szymanski’s (2014: 227) claim that to call 
them ‘fair play’ regulations is an ‘abuse of language’. Irrespective of the intentions of 
UEFA, they clearly lack the expertise, capability and/or appetite to seriously consider the 
health of elite football in terms of the ideals and values that it ought to instantiate. 
McNamee (2014) has argued similarly in terms of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA) regulations, where it is argued that there appears to be an unjustifiable 
medicalization of doping7. Under such conditions, doping primarily becomes a matter of 
health risk, and leaves little room to discuss and evaluate risks to the spirit and ideals of 
sporting competition. A similar problem arises with regards to financial doping, where 
governing bodies seem incapable, or at least unwilling, to engage in meaningful and 
informed discussions on the conditions required for fair and just competitions. Part of the 
problem here, as with medical doping, is that such discussions are usually dominated by 
policy advisors, sport lawyers, and financial experts, and without the input of 
philosophers. 
This discussion regarding the role and intentions of governing bodies raises once again 
MacIntyre’s distinction between institutions and practices, of which readers of this journal 
are no doubt familiar. The inability of UEFA to seriously consider the ‘spirit of sport’ is 
another example of the corrupting tendencies of institutions that undermines the internal 
goods of the practices which they are meant to sustain (MacIntyre, 2007: 194). It is 
important, however, not to exaggerate the contrast between practices and institutions, for 
achieving the external goods of sport is to a certain degree parasitic on achieving the 
internal ones in the first place (McNamee, 1995; Simon, 2000). This is especially true in 
sports where it is often the case the best way of ensuring the external rewards (be they 
profits, popularity, success) is to ensure that the game is shown in its best light by letting 
the internal goods flourish (for example, by modifying the rules in order to encourage 
attacking play, or to introduce financial regulations that would ensure competitive balance 
and unpredictability). The institutions, which MacIntyre (2007: 194) argues are 
‘characteristically and necessarily’ concerned with external goods, are thus often kept in 
check by the internal goods of the practice. This would suggest that institutions are 
unlikely to corrupt the internal goods of practices to the extent that they can no longer, as 
a result, acquire the external goods. In other words, in the absence of internal goods, it is 
unclear upon which basis the external goods can be achieved at all. 
In the context of commercialised sport, Walsh and Guilianotti (2007) have referred to the 
‘pragmatic pathology’ where the over-commercialisation of sport undermines the valuable 
aspects of sport that make it marketable in the first place. The hypothesis is, that if 
commercialised sport undermines the values that make sport worthwhile and attractive, 
then supporters will eventually lose interest in the game. In this sense, if fans realise that 
success is primarily determined by wealth, and that most teams in the league have no real 
chance of competing for the trophy, then their attraction to the game will lessen. Whilst 
this seems logical, anecdotal evidence seems to suggest otherwise. There is no clear 
evidence that support for such competition is waning, or that supporters are turning away 
in despair. If anything, elite football seems to be thriving. One way to explain this paradox 
is that the unfairness sustained by financial practices in elite football are to some degree 
inconspicuous and ulterior to the game itself. A rather more depressing explanation is that 
this is further evidence of how deep market rhetoric is engrained in contemporary 
sporting culture. This is reminiscent of Lasch’s (1988: 406-7) claim that the masses crave 
trivial recreation and that they’ve become ‘sensation-minded and blood-thirsty’ and their 
engagement one of vegetative ‘passivity’. Whatever the explanation, what is clear is that 
part of the problem with UEFA’s lack of action with regards to financial domination is that 
the practice community itself seems largely indifferent or unaware of the degree which the 
internal goods of sport are being corrupted by the market. 
The above discussion reflects the tensions between different interpretations of elite sports. 
Loland (2007) has offered a useful typology of these various ‘thick interpretations’ of 
justice in sport, which represent considerable differences in how elite sport should be 
played, valued and organised. Our position in this paper is clearly aligned with the  
‘purist’ and ‘supporter’ typologies, both of which are ‘profoundly sceptical of 
commercialisation’ and the ‘trivialisation of competitive sport’ (Loland, 2007:  86). ‘Cynics’ 
who harbour a ‘win at all cost mentality’, and ‘consumers’, who’s key concern is 
entertainment, might be much more sympathetic and unconcerned with the empirical 
evidence presented here. Whilst Libertarian approaches to sport policy (see Ciomaga and 
Kent, 2015) might be content with adopting a laizzes-faire attitude towards these different 
understandings of sport, we believe the ‘cynic’ and ‘consumer’ perspective demonstrate 
an alarming lack of concern regarding the ethical standing and future of sport. Whilst we 
are not suggesting that the empirical evidence presented here will convince everyone that 
elite sport is suffering from the pathological consequences of over-commercialisation, we 
do hope that they at least harbour the potential to stimulate some dialogue in the sports 




In this paper, three key arguments have been made. Firstly, we presented empirical 
evidence to demonstrate the extent to which money determines success in the EPL 
between 1992 and 2016. In light of this empirical evidence, we have argued that the 
performance advantage teams gain through financial investments is contrary to the spirit 
of sport. The effect of money in elite football undermines the importance of athletic 
excellence in sport and also the ‘sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome’ that is central to 
good competition. We have also argued that the ways in which the spirit of sport is 
undermined by financial investments is somewhat inconspicuous as they are ulterior to 
the ‘game’ itself. As a result of this ethical evaluation of the empirical evidence, we argued 
that financial investments in elite football ought to be regulated and controlled and that 
current FFP regulations are inadequate as they focus on issues concerning financial health, 
rather than the health of the game in terms of spirit and fairness. Whilst it was beyond the 
scope of this study to offer concrete policy recommendations, the work does point towards 
certain principles that could guide and direct such recommendations. In making these 
arguments we are not naïvely suggesting that the influence of money can be eradicated in 
sport, nor do we deny that there are other factors that might undermine the spirit of sport 
in similar ways. Some team must win for some reason, and it is inevitable that some teams 
will be more dominant than others. Our claim is a rather simpler one, namely that things 
would be better if elite football were more competitive, unpredictable and where there is 
increased mobility in terms of who wins. Before this can happen, however, the supporters 
and general public may need persuading that there is a problem that needs addressing. 
 
 
                                                          
1 According to Kretchmar (1975) this phrase was first used by Warren Fraleigh. 
2 The EPL was founded in 1992, and was known as the English first division prior to this. 
3 Other authors (for example Hall and Szymanski, 2002) have successfully used wage bills 
for the same purpose.  Both methods of calculating spending have advantages and 
disadvantages. Whilst calculating wages would take account of free transfer players who 
are on very high salaries, individual wages are very difficult to collate and also complex to 
accurately calculate in light of bonus systems. Our hypothesis is that calculating wages 
and transfer price would generally demonstrate similar patterns between spending and 
success. 
4 When one compares the potential advantage that athletes may gain from performance 
enhancing drugs and methods to the advantage EPL teams gain from spending, then 
financial doping seems more outwardly problematic than medical doping. Considering 
the secretive nature of medical doping, it is very difficult to measure its effect on success. 
How much performance enhancement one might gain from taking certain drugs or 
methods therefore, is difficult to calculate. The positive correlation between the spending 
of clubs and their sporting success in the EPL, however, is visible and can be statistically 
proven.  
5 One could argue that taking performance enhancing drugs ought not to be considered a 
form of cheating, but one cannot claim that cheating itself can be accepted as part of sport. 
6 Another example might be the route of a particular edition of the Tour de France, and 
the type of qualities required to win the yellow jersey. It could be argued that a race that 
includes several lengthy and relatively flat time trials and relatively few difficult 
mountainous stages does not adequately test who is the best all round cyclist. Here then 
there are disputes regarding what excellences are at play, and what excellences ought to 
be tested and awarded. 
7 McNamee’s objection to WADA regulations as medicalization was to a potential change 
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